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The Emotional Trauma of
Hijacking: Who Pays?
INTRODUCTION
The issue of recovery for negligently inflicted mental distress
has long been debated.' Objections to recovery include the dif-
ficulty of proving and measuring damages and the potential for
vexatious and fictitious claims. 2 Nevertheless, the trend in recent
years has been to permit recovery for mental distress alone.' The
See, e.g., Abramovsky, Compensation for Passengers of Hijacked Aircraft, 21
Bun. L. Ray. 339, 348-49 (1971-72).
Traditionally, the common law did not recognize a separate cause of action
for negligently inflicted mental distress .... The first breakthrough in
permitting recovery... occurred when the courts permitted recovery where
the defendant's negligent acts caused physical injuries to the plaintiff which
were accompanied by mental distress.... For many years the courts
restricted recovery ... to cases where "impact" occurred.... In recent
times, the irhpact doctrine has been abandoned by most jurisdictions.
Id. See generally R. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 12 (5th ed. 1984) ("the
law has been slow to accept the interest in peace of mind as entitled to independent
legal protection") [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
2 See PROSSER, supra note 1, at § 12; Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 348.
See Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 349 (citing Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729
(N.Y. 1961)). See also Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983)
(independent cause of action exists when mental distress is "medically diagnosable" and
of "sufficient severity so as to be medically significant"); Schultz v. Barberton Glass
Co., 447 N.E.2d 109, 110-13 (Ohio 1983) ("Emotional injury can be as severe and
debilitating as physical harm and is deserving of redress .... [A] cause of action may
be stated for the negligent infliction of serious emotional distress without a contempo-
ranious physical injury."); Chapetta v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019, 1022
(La. App. 1982) (recovery permitted for mental distress arising from vehicular accident,
although plaintiff was not physically injured); Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station,
632 P.2d 1066, 1069-71 (Hawaii 1981) (damages for mental distress to family members
for negligently inflicted death of family dog); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hospitals, 616
P.2d 813, 815-21 (Cal. 1980) (cause of action existed for mental distress arising from
negligent medical examination and diagnosis); Montinieri v. Southern New Eng. Tel.
Co., 398 A.2d 1180, 1182-84 (Conn. 1978) ("[R]ecovery for unintentionally-caused
emotional distress does not depend on proof of either an ensuing physical injury or a
risk of harm from physical impact.").
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issue has arisen over the last decade in the context of the Warsaw
Convention 4-may an airline passenger who is subjected to the
terror of a hijacking, and whose only injury therefrom is typi-
cally mental distress, recover under the Convention?5 The answer
to this question is uncertain at best.
This Note examines four cases that have decided the issue
and reached conflicting results. A legal and historical back-
ground is presented initially to familiarize the reader With air
carrier liability vis-a-vis the Warsaw Convention.
I. CAIEuR LUIA TrY-ORDiNARY TORT PR cniPLEs
The liability of air carriers for injuries to passengers on
international flights is governed exclusively by the Warsaw Con-
vention. 6 In the absence of a statutory rule to the contrary,
carrier liability for injuries incurred on domestic flights is gov-
erned by the ordinary rules of negligence.7 Accordingly, an in-
jured plaintiff must establish the carrier's duty of care toward
him and a breach of that duty, and that the breach was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's identifiable injuries.8 Further,
the plaintiff must prove himself free of contributory negligence
in jurisdictions following that doctrine. 9
An airline is a common carrier and thus is required to
exercise a high degree of care for the safety of its passengers.' 0
While it has long been held that an airline is not an insurer of
its passengers' safety," it is nevertheless held to a very high, or
4 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137
L.N.T.S. 11 (1934) [hereinafter referred to and cited as Warsaw Convention].
See notes 76-77 infra aid accompanying text.
6 See notes 21-177 infra and accompanying text.
7 See 8 AM. JUR. 2d Aviation § 88 (1980); Annot., 72 A.L.R. 3d 1299, 1301-02
(1976). For a discussion of carrier liability arising from hijackings of domestic flights,
see Comment, Liability of Air Carriers for Injuries to Passengers Resulting From
Domestic Hijackings and Related Incidents, 46 J. Am L. & Com. 147 (1981).
8 See Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 343.
9 See id.
,o See PRossER, supra note 1, at § 34; Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 343.
" See Connolly v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 216 A.2d 60, 62 (Pa. 1966); Shamblee
v. Virginia Transit Co., 132 S.E.2d 712, 714 (Va. 1963); Quigley v. Wilson Line of
Mass., Inc., 154 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Mass. 1958).
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the highest, standard of care.' 2 However, this duty does not
include the responsibility of protecting against events that are
not reasonably foreseeable.' 3 Arguably, hijackings are reasonably
foreseeable events;' 4 therefore, airline carriers must exercise the
highest duty of care to prevent hijackings. A breach of that duty
could be established by proving the carrier's failure to provide
or negligent use of mechanical screening devices.'5 A breach of
this nature would not be superseded by the hijacker's intervening
criminal act, and would establish the requisite proximate cau-
sation. 6
Proof of an identifiable injury-in-fact is the final element of
a hijacking victim's prima facie case. While it is clear that
damages for actual bodily injuries can be recovered, there is
some question concerning recovery for damages resulting solely
from mental distress. 7 This is a particularly significant issue to
most hijacking victims, whose only injuries result from mental
distress and consist of mental anguish caused by the hijacking. 8
Although negligence actions for mental distress alone were not
recognized historically, 9 many jurisdictions today permit recov-
12 See Mobile Cab & Baggage Co. v. Busby, 169 So. 2d 314, 316-17 (Al. 1964);
North v. Williams, 366 P.2d 406, 408 (Okla. 1961); Collier v. Citizens Coach Co., 330
S.W.2d 74, 76-77 (Ark. 1959); Angelo v. Pittsburg Rys., 151 A.2d 867, 869 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1959).
" See Annot., supra note 7, at 1301.
"4 See Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 345-47 ("[Rlecurrent hijacking attacks strongly
suggest the imminence of others .... ).
11 Mr. Abramovsky argues that "it has long been held that an airline's failure to
equip its aircraft with adequate safety devices constitutes actionable negligence . .the
underlying rationale can logically be extended to safety devices located at the boarding
gate." Id. at 346.
'f See id.
7 See id. at 347-48.
See id. at 348.
Traditionally, the common law did not recognize a separate cause of action
for negligently inflicted mental distress. The attitude of the common law
was succinctly stated by Lord Wensleydale when he stated [in Lynch v.
Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (Ex. 1861)]: "[mlental pain or anxiety the
law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress when the unlawful act
... causes that alone .... ." Several arguments have been offered to sup-
port this rationale. They [include] that it is difficult to prove.., that even
if proved it would be difficult to assess the monetary damages ... that
.. many spurious actions would be commenced.
KENTUCicY LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 74
ery for mental anguish where there is "no doubt as to the
presence and extent of the damage and the fact that it was
proximately caused by [the] defendant's negligence." 20
II. CARRIER LIABILITY-THE WARsAW CONVENTION
On October 12, 1929, the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air
was completed and opened for signature in Warsaw, Poland.
2'
The Convention was intended to provide legal certainty to the
world's developing airline industry. 22 This international treaty
has become commonly known as the Warsaw Convention. 2 The
Convention resulted from the expressed concerns of investors
and insurance companies over the uncertainty of the law covering
international flights. 24 The potential for unlimited liability for a
single accident was prohibitive; 2 variations in litigation rules and
practices among countries contributed to the uncertainty. 26 The
Convention established an "international code for declaring the
rights and liabilities of the parties to contracts of international
carriage by air." 27 The United States accepted the Convention
10 Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731 (N.Y. 1961). See cases cited supra note
3.
21 See 8 Am. JUR. 2d Aviation § 113 (1980). "The Warsaw Convention was the
result of two international conferences held in Paris in 1925 and Warsaw in 1929, and
of the work done by the interim Comit6 International Technique d'Experts Juridique
A&iens (CITEJA) created by the Paris Conference." Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The
United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REv. 497, 498 (1966-67). The
official text of the Convention is in French. Any citations contained herein will use the
English translation provided at Warsaw Convention, 49 Stat. 3014-23 (1934).
22 The prologue to the Convention indicates that the parties thereto drafted the
agreement in recognition of "the advantage of regulating in a uniform manner the
conditions of international transportation by air in respect of the documents used for
such transportation and of the liability of the carrier ... ." 49 Stat. at 3014. See also
Note, Up in the Air Without a Ticket: Interpretation and Revision of the Warsaw
Convention, 6 FoRDHari INT'L L.J. 332, 334 (1982-83) ("The essential purpose of the
Convention was to provide the world's fledgling airline industry with a 'legal basis' for
its operation.").
1 See Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 350.
20 See Minutes, Second International Conference on Private Air Law, Oct. 4-12,
1929, Warsaw 20-23 (R. Horner & D. Legrez ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Minutes].
See also Note, supra note 22, at 335 n.16.
11 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 21, at 499-500.
26 See id. at 498-99.
27 Note, supra note 22, at 335 (quoting Grein v. Imperial Airways [1937] 1 K.B.
50, 75 (C.A. 1936)).
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by presidential proclamation on October 29, 1934,28 upon the
express condition that the Convention was not to apply to in-
ternational transport performed by the United States govern-
ment.
29
The Convention eliminated the prior uncertainty and enabled
airline companies to obtain private investors and insurance cov-
erage by exchanging a presumption of carrier liability as a quid
pro quo for limited passenger recovery. 0 Article 17 of the treaty
provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event
of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily
injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused
the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or
in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disem-
barking.3
Once it has been proven that the accident resulting in injury or
death occurred either on the airplane or while the passenger was
embarking or disembarking, the burden shifts to the airline to
prove that it took "all necessary measures" to avoid the acci-
dent,3 2 or that the passenger was contributorily negligent. 33 Thus,
the carrier's liability is not absolute under the Convention, but
11 See 49 Stat. 3000. The Convention was completed and opened for signature on
October 12, 1929. It became effective on February 13, 1933; however, under article 38(1)
it remained open for adherence by any state. The United States accepted the Convention
by depositing its "instrument of adherence ... in the archives of the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs of Poland on July 31, 1934," making its adherence effective 90 days
thereafter pursuant to the provisions of article 38(2) and (3). See id. at 3013. The
presidential proclamation declared publicly the United States adherence to the Conven-
tion as of October 29, 1934, providing that "every article and clause [of the Convention]
may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States of America and the
citizens thereof. . . ." Id.
" The presidential proclamation accepting the Convention conditioned the United
States adherence upon "the reservation ... that the first paragraph of Article 2 of the
Convention shall not apply to international transportation that may be performed by
the United States of America or any territory or possession under its jurisdiction." Id.
at 3013.
' See Note, supra note 22, at 335 n.20 (citing Minutes, supra note 24, at 37-39).
" Warsaw Convention, supra note 4, at art. 17.
See id. at art. 20(1).
See id. at art. 21.
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is presumed under article 17.14 Nevertheless, if the carrier fails
to rebut the presumption, it will be held liable.
The strong presumption created by article 17 is tempered by
the low liability limits established by article 22. Article 22 creates
an upper limit on a passenger's recovery of 125,000 francs, or
approximately $8,300.00. 3- Article 25(1) establishes the only ex-
ception to this recovery ceiling, providing:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provi-
sions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if
the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such
default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court
to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent
to wilful misconduct. 36
A. Prerequisites and Particulars
Articles I and 3 define the threshold requisites necessary for
the Warsaw Convention to apply. Article I(1) provides that the
Convention applies only "to all international transportation of
persons. .. -37 Article 1(2) defines transportation as interna-
tional when:
[A]ccording to the contract made by the parties, the place of
departure and the place of destination, whether or not there
be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situ-
ated either within the territories of two High Contracting Par-
ties, 38 or within the territory of a single High Contracting
Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory
34 See Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 350.
" See Warsaw Convention, supra note 4, at art. 22. The dollar equivalent of
$8300.00 has been used since the United States devaluation of the franc in 1933. See
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 21, at 499 n.10.
See Warsaw Convention, supra note 4, at art. 25 (emphasis added).
1" Id. at art. 1(1).
"High Contracting Parties" refers to those countries that participated in the
drafting of the Convention and thereafter accepted the agreement as a signatory, by
ratification or adherence. The initial parties to the Convention included the German
Reich, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, Iceland, Egypt, Spain,
Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britian, Ireland and the British Dominions, India,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxemburg, Mexico, Norway, the Netherlands,
Poland, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Venezuela, and Yu-
goslavia. 49 Stat. at 3014.
[Vol. 74
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subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority
of another power, even though that power is not a party to
this convention. Transportation without such an agreed stop-
ping place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suz-
erainty, mandate, or authority of the same High Contracting
Party shall not be deemed to be international for the purposes
of this convention. 9
The contract between the parties is the passenger ticket, 4°
which must be in writing and delivered to the passenger.4' For
the Convention limits to apply, article 3 also requires that the
ticket contain certain "particulars. " 42 The treaty provides:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver
a passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places...;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the
rules relating to liability established by this conven-
tion.43
Failure by a carrier to deliver the ticket, or to list any of the
particulars, especially a statement of the carrier's liability, would
render the Convention-and the carrier's liability limitation-
inapplicable to any subsequent accident 4 Further, it is the ticket
that establishes the international status of the flight, 45 by the
required statement of "the place of departure and of destina-
-1 Warsaw Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1(2).
40 The "contract" between the parties and regulated by the Convention is the
ticket issued by the carrier and accepted by the passenger. See In Re Air Crash in Bali,
Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1120-21 (C.D. Cal. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 684
F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Note, supra note 22, at 338 ("The passenger ticket
... is the contract....").
4' Warsaw Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1(2).
42 See id. at art. 3(l).
41 Id.
" See, e.g., Ross v. Pan American Airways, 85 N.E.2d 880, 885 (N.Y. 1949)
("[D]elivery of a ticket is thus a condition set up by the Convention itself, as a
determinant of the applicability, or no, of the Convention's limited liability rules....");
Note, supra note 22, at 340 ("mhe carrier must ... deliver the ticket containing the
essential particulars to avail itself of the limitation on liability....
41 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1(2).
1985-86]
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tion.' '46 Taken together, articles 1 and 3 achieve the primary
purpose of the Convention.4 7 The requirements permit "parties
to clearly establish their rights and liabilities prior to the initial




Debate in the United States concerning the inadequacy of
the Convention's limit on liability began soon after ratification
in 1934 and has not subsided.49 In September, 1955, the Hague
Protocol was established to amend the Warsaw Convention.5
The Protocol doubled the liability limitations to 250,000 francs,
or approximately $16,000.00,51 and made the passenger ticket
prima facie evidence of the contract between the parties.5 2 The
United States refused to ratify the protocol because it considered
the liability limit too low. 5 3 In 1965, the United States gave
46 See id. at art. 3(l)(b).
4' See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 22, at
341 ("[T]he interrelationship between article 1 and article 3 guarantees that the Conven-
tion's essential purpose will be achieved.").
41 Note, supra note 22, at 341.
41 See id. at 342-43.
"o Protocol Amending the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (1963), U.S. Civil
Aeuronautics Board, Aeronautical Statutes and Related Material 473 (rev. ed. 1974)
[hereinafter referred to and cited as Hague Protocol]. The Hague Protocol resulted from
the long-standing debate over the inadequacies of the Warsaw Convention. A diplomatic
conference was conducted at The Hague in September, 1955, "after ten years of
discussions, meetings, and drafts." See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 21, at 504.
On September 28, 1955, the Protocol was opened for signature; it became effective on
August 1, 1963. See id. at 541. The Protocol effectively amended the Warsaw Convention
with respect to signatory countries. See Note, supra note 22, at 343.
"1 Article XI amended article 22(j) of the Convention to provide that "the liability
of the carrier for each such passenger is limited to the sum of two hundred and fifty
thousand francs." 478 U.N.T.S. at 381. Although the liability limitation amount is
stated in francs, it was debated in terms of francs or dollars, and set at 250,000 francs,
or $16,600.00. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 21, at 506-09. The limitation
is absolute-there is no provision for inflation or currency fluctuations.
12 See Hague Protocol, supra note 50, art. III.
" See Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 351. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 21, at 509-46 ("The opponents of the Convention attacked limitation of
liability in general, arguing that international aviation had no claim for special protec-
tion.").
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notice of its denunciation of the Warsaw Convention because of
the low recovery limit.5 4 An interim private agreement among
air carriers, commonly known as the Montreal Agreement," was
reached in 1966 one day before the effective date of the United
States denunciation of the Warsaw Convention.
5 6
The Montreal Agreement is a special contract among signa-
tory air carriers5 7 that substantially improves the position of
injured passengers. The signatories agreed to increase their lia-
bility to $75,000.00 for injuries or deaths occurring on interna-
tional flights58 when the United States is a "point of origin, a
point of destination, or a scheduled stopping point, ' 59 to be
determined from the passenger ticket.6 Further, the signatories
agreed to waive their defenses under articles 20 and 21 of the
Convention,6' replacing the presumption of liability standard
6 2
with absolute liability under the Agreement.
63
" See 53 Dept. State Bull. 924 (1965). Article 39(1) of the Convention permits
"[a]ny one of the High Contracting Parties [to] denounce this convention," provided
that notice is sent to the Polish government, which in turn notifies all of the other
parties. Article 39(2) further provides that denunciation becomes effective six months
after notification, and operates only with respect to the denouncing party. Warsaw
Convention, supra note 4, at art. 39.
" Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the
Hague Protocol, C.A.B. Agreement No. 18,900, approved C.A.B. Order No. E-23680,
31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter referred to and cited as Montreal Agreement].
"6 See Note, supra note 22, at 345. For a thorough discussion of the circumstances
leading up to and surrounding the Montreal Agreement, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 21, at 546-602.
17 "The Montreal Agreement is not an international treaty but is merely an
agreement between air carriers approved by the United States Government. Such an
agreement is sanctioned by article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention." Abramovsky,
supra note 1, at 351 n.67. Signatories to the Agreement include air carriers from all
over the world. For a complete listing of the signatories, see U.S. Civil Aeronautics
Board, supra note 50, at 515-16.
5s See Montreal Agreement, supra note 55, at l(1). The $75,000.00 liability figure
is stated in United States dollars. See id.
5 Id. at 1.
6 See id.; Note, supra note 22, at 345.
61 See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
12 See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
6 The Agreement provides in pertinent part, "The carrier shall not, with respect
to any claim arising out of the death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a passenger,
avail itself of any defense under Article 20(l) of said Convention or said Convention as
amended by said Protocol." Montreal Agreement, supra note 55, at 1(2). See also
Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 351 ("[The Agreement replaced the presumption of
liability standard with absolute liability.").
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C. Application of the Warsaw Convention
The Montreal Agreement merely modified the recovery lim-
itations of the Warsaw Convention among signatory air carriers;
the Convention continues to apply in full force in all other
respects.64 As a treaty to which the United States has adhered,
the Convention is the "supreme law of the land, ' 65 and it
provides an exclusive remedy for cases within its purview. 6
Article 1(1) provides that "[t]his convention shall apply to all
international transportation of persons ... performed by air-
craft for hire." 6 7
Article 24 of the Convention further provides:
(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for
damages, however founded, can only be brought subject
to the conditions and limits set out in this convention.
(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the
preceding paragraph shall also apply ....
Article 24 has been interpreted as not limiting the kind of cause
of action a passenger may bring-i.e., tort or breach of con-
tract.69 Rather, the phrase "however founded" has been con-
strued to "accommodate all of the multifarious bases on which a
claim might be founded in different countries, whether under
code law or common law. .... ,,70 If the passenger's claim as
stated comes within the terms of articles 17 or 18, however, it
"can only be brought subject to the conditions and limitations
established by the Warsaw system.
' 7'
See Note, supra note 22, at 345-46 (Montreal Agreement "did not modify the
original Convention").
61 See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) [hereinafter referred to as Husserl II]. The Convention's status as a treaty has
been debated by some commentators, but accepted by most. For a discussion of the
debate, see Note, supra note 22, at 342 n.54.
66 See text accompanying note 67 infra; 388 F. Supp. at 1243-45.
61 Warsaw Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
6I Id. at art. 24 (emphasis added).
69 See 388 F. Supp. at 1245-46.
70 Id. at 1245.
71 Id.
[V/ol. 74
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III. THm WARSAW CONVENTION, HJACKINGS,
AND MENTAL ANGUISH
By its terms, the Warsaw Convention is relatively straight-
forward and unambiguous. It provides a uniform system of
liability and recovery for international air carrier "accidents." 72
Nevertheless, certain criminal developments since 1929 have ren-
dered the Convention's terms ambiguous. Airline hijackings were
"probably not within the specific contemplation of the parties
at the time the Warsaw Convention was promulgated .... "73
The Montreal Agreement indirectly established that hijackings
are considered "accidents" under the Convention and thus sub-
ject to its limitations, 74 but it left unclear the precise nature of
72 See notes 23-36 supra and accompanying text. Article 17 provides for carrier
liability for personal injuries arising from "accident[s]" on board or around the aircraft.
71 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as Husseri I].
14 The Agreement does not expressly refer to "accidents" or "hijackings;" rather,
it modifies the liability language of the Convention to provide absolute carrier liability
in the amount of $75,000.00 "for each passenger for death, wounding, or other bodily
injury." Montreal Agreement, supra note 55, at 1(1). The Agreement omits the
Convention's reference contained in article 17 to "accident" as the causation of "death
or wounding ... or any other bodily injury." In Hussed I, the court stated that "the
Montreal Agreement seems to resolve whatever doubt might have existed over the
construction of the word 'accident.' " 351 F. Supp. at 706. The court reasoned:
It is significant that press releases of the State Department and the order
of the Civil Aeronautics Board do not mention the word "accident" in
the context of recovering for personal injury, but rather accept the prop-
osition that the Montreal Agreement imposes a system of "absolute liabil-
ity" upon the carrier.
Id. (citing C.A.B. Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966); Department of State
Press Release Nos. 110, 111; 54 Dept. State Bull. 955, 956 (1966)).
Further, the Agreement itself expressly precludes its application to "any claim
brought by, on behalf of, or in respect of any person who has wilfully caused damage
which resulted in death, wounding, or other bodily injury...." Montreal Agreement,
supra note 55, at 1(2). The purpose is to prevent "It]hose guilty of sabotage and
persons claiming on their behalf ... [from] recover[ing] any damages." 54 Dept. State
Bull. at 956. The Husserl I court drew the inference that "the innocent victims of wilful
acts by others are to be able to recover ... even in respect to acts of sabotage," and
concluded that the "analogy between hijacking and sabotage is clear." 351 F. Supp. at
707.
Finally, Professor Lowenfeld, who represented the State Department at the Mon-
treal meetings, has stated that "sabotage is quite clearly included in the area of recovery
under [the] Montreal [Agreement] (except for someone claiming on behalf of the per-
petrator himself)." Lowenfeld, Hijacking, Warsaw, and the Problem of Psychic Trauma,
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a passenger's remedy. 75 Thus,, death or physical injuries resulting
from a hijacking are now covered by the Convention via the
Agreement, 76 yet questions remain as to whether a passenger
may recover damages when his only injury consists of mental
distress. 77 The resolution of this issue is vitally important to most
hijacking victims, whose sole injuries are mental anguish and
distress.
78
To trigger application of the Convention and the Montreal
Agreement, a passenger's injuries must fafi within the terms of
article 17. 79 Article 17 enumerates the injuries for which air
carriers may be held liable.80 The debate as to whether mental
distress is included centers around the translation of article 17
from its original French text.8 ' The English translation of article
17 states in pertinent part: "The carrier shall be liable for
damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a
passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passen-
ger .... 112 Mental distress is not the equivalent of "death or
I SYR. J. INT'L L. & Com. 345, 346 (1973). This result is consistent with the purpose of
the Montreal Agreement to impose absolute liability on air carriers for death, wounding
or other bodily injury, irrespective of fault. See id.
" See Husserl II, 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See generally Low-
enfeld, supra note 74, at 345 (discussing whether psychological injuries are covered under
the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement).
76 See note 74 supra and accompanying text. Article 17 of the Convention clearly
provides recovery for physical injuries or death resulting from an accident on board or
around the air craft.
" See Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322, 1323 (C.D.
Cal. 1975) (Montreal Agreement permits recovery for mental distress); 388 F. Supp. at
1242-45 (Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement permit recovery for mental
injuries); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 314 N.E.2d 848, 857 (N.Y. 1974) (Warsaw
Convention does not support claim that psychological trauma alone is compensable);
Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (D.N.M. 1973) (Warsaw
Convention does not provide recovery for mental anguish); Abramovsky, supra note 1,
at 348 ("This issue is of extreme importance since most hijackings to date have not
involved the actual infliction of physical injury upon passengers by the hijacker.");
Lowenfeld, supra note 74.
'a See Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 348.
11 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 4, at art. 17; Montreal Agreement, supra
note 55, at 1(2); 388 F. Supp. at 1245. This requirement is in addition to the two
requisites discussed at notes 37-46 supra and accompanying text.
0 See note 82 infra and accompanying text.
91 The Warsaw Convention was drafted and written in French in its entirety. See
314 N.E.2d at 851. It is reprinted in French at 49 Stat. 3000-09 (1934).
12 49 Stat. 3018 (emphasis added).
TRAum OF HIJACKING
wounding. ' 8 3 The question, then, is whether mental distress may
be considered as "any other bodily injury" under the terms of
article 17. On this question, the courts have been divided.
A. Burnett v. Trans World Airlines
Burnett v. Trans World AirlinesP was a suit filed by a
husband and wife who were passengers on board a Trans World
Airlines (TWA) flight scheduled to fly from Athens, Greece, to
New York, New York. In the course of the flight, members of
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLO) diverted
the airplane and forced the pilot to land in the desert near
Amman, Jordan.8 5 The plaintiffs and other passengers were held
captive for six days in the close confines of the airplane's cabin.
The plaintiffs were deprived of regular food and water and
subjected to the temperature extremes of the desert. In addition,
Mr. Burnett experienced swelling in his ankles, and the couple
feared that their lives were in jeopardy. As a result, the Burnetts
claimed to have suffered severe emotional trauma.
6
The Burnetts sued TWA under the Warsaw Convention for
their mental distress and its physical manifestations.8 7 Both par-
ties stipulated that the Convention and the Montreal Agreement
applied to the suit, and if article 17 covered the injuries, then
TWA was absolutely liable up to $75,000.00. ss
The plaintiffs argued that mental anguish alone is compen-
sable under article 17's provision for "bodily injury," and that
the tort law of New Mexico applied to determine the scope of
the term.89 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument regarding
the substantive law to be applied, stating that "the meaning of
the Warsaw Convention is a matter of federal law. It is a
sovereign treaty and as such is the supreme law of the land,
See 388 F. Supp. at 1250.





'+ Id. at 1155. The plaintiffs argued that because jurisdiction in the federal court




preempting local law in the areas where it applies." 90 The court
determined that because the Convention was drafted in French,
the French legal meaning of "bodily injury" applied, and that
French law distinguished between "lesion corporelle" (bodily
injury) and "lesion mentale" (mental injury). 9' The court held
that mental anguish alone is not a compensable bodily injury
under the Warsaw Convention, 92 citing Husserl v. Swiss Air
Transport Co.93 (Husserl 1) as support. "[T]he court in Husserl
[I] ... proceeding on a similar analysis, reached an identical
conclusion in observing that mental anguish alone does not fall
within the purview of Article 17. 94 However, the conclusion
cited by the Burnett court was dictum in Husserl I, and was
expressly overruled by the same federal district court in Husserl
v. Swiss Air Transport Co. (Husserl IM).9
The Burnett court concluded by reviewing the legislative
history of the 1929 Warsaw Convention and the intent of its
draftsmen.9 6 The court found its conclusion-that mental an-
guish is not covered by the Convention-consistent with the
intent of the draftsmen, stating:
By thus restricting recovery to bodily injuries, the inference
is strong that the Convention intended to narrow the otherwise
broad scope of liability under the former draft and preclude
recovery for mental anguish alone. Had the delegates desired
otherwise, there would have been no reason to so substantially
modify the proposed draft of the First Conference. 97
Nevertheless, the inference drawn by the Burnett court is not as
strong as it suggests, considering that causes of action for mental
- Id. (citations omitted). Contra Lowenfeld, supra note 74, at 349-50.
9l 368 F. Supp. at 1156.
9 Id. at 1158.
351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
, 368 F. Supp. at 1156 (quoting 351 F. Supp. at 708).
388 F. Supp. 1238, 1250-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
368 F. Supp. at 1156-57.
9' Id. at 1157. The predecessor of the Warsaw Convention, the First International
Conference on Private Air Law, proposed a liability section that provided that "[t]he
carrier is liable for accidents, losses, damage to goods and delays." Id. The broad scope
of this provision was substantially narrowed by the Second International Conference's
restriction of carrier liability for death, wounding or other bodily injury. See Warsaw
Convention, supra note 4, at art. 17.
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anguish alone were not as generally recognized in 1929 as they
are today.9
B. Rosman v. Trans World Airlines
The plaintiffs in Rosman v. Trans World Airlines" were
among the passengers on board the same hijacked TWA flight
at issue in Burnett. 10 Mrs. Rosman claimed that she had suffered
a backache, swollen feet, and discoloration of her legs and back
resulting from forced immobility.'0' Her two children claimed to
have developed skin irritations and boils from lack of sanitary
facilities. 0 2 The Rosmans and a fourth plaintiff, Miriam Her-
man, whose actions were consolidated for appeal, 03 all claimed
dehydration and weight loss resulting from inadequate food and
water.' 4 Finally, all plaintiffs claimed "severe psychic trauma."' 0 5
The court found such trauma natural, stating that "[w]hile none
of them alleged to have been shot, struck or personally assaulted
by any of the hijackers, the plaintiffs, all Jewish, naturally
feared that their lives were in grave danger."'0
The court recognized that TWA would be absolutely liable
under article 17 of the Warsaw Convention for "death or wound-
ing..., or any other bodily injury" suffered by the plaintiffs.'0
7
It then proceeded to determine whether mental distress is encom-
passed by the term "bodily injury." The court forund that as a
treaty, the Warsaw Convention is the "supreme law of the
land, ' 1t08 and that although the treaty is written in French and
11 Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 314 N.E.2d 848, 859 (N.Y. 1974) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("Certainly, psychic trauma was not an area generally embraced within
the term 'bodily injury' at the time or times of the drafting and writing of the Conven-
tion. In fact in even so progressive a State as New York, it is not too long ago that...
one was permitted to maintain an action to recover for emotional and neurological
disturbances negligently caused.") (citations omitted).
Id. at 848.
' See notes 84-86 supra and accompanying text.






Id. at 849 (citing the Warsaw Convention, supra note 4, at art. 17).
Id. at 852 (citing U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2).
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its meaning is the French legal meaning,'09 its interpretation is
not governed by French law." 0 Further, the court found no
"useful purpose" in conducting a hearing to determine if the
Convention's draftsmen intended to include mental distress un-
der article 17."' The court noted:
Our study of the minutes of the Convention indicates that the
drafters did not define or discuss what was meant by the phrase
"death or wounding ... or any other bodily injury" in Article
17.... In addition, the question of whether psychic injury is
a "bodily injury" "was never talked about at Montreal.""1
2
The court concluded that the treaty should be interpreted ac-
cording to its purposes and the ordinary meaning of its terms."
3
The Rosman court held that the plaintiffs could prove at
trial" 4 and recover for "palpable, objective bodily injuries suf-
fered, whether caused by psychic trauma or by physical condi-
tions on the aircraft, irrespective of impact." '"15 But the plaintiffs
could not prove or recover "for psychic trauma alone." 6 The
court held that psychic trauma alone is not covered under article
17's provision for "bodily injury," reasoning:
The inclusion of the term "bodily" to modify "injury" cannot
be ignored, and in its ordinary usage, the term "bodily"
suggests opposition to "mental."... In our view, therefore,
the ordinary, natural meaning of "bodily injury" as used in
Article 17 connotes palpable, conspicuous physical injury, and
- Id. at 853 (citing Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 330
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1967)).
11 314 N.E.2d at 853-54.
Id. at 854.
112 Id. at 854 (quoting Lowenfeld, supra note 74, at 347-48). The court stated that
"[t]he minutes of the Convention indicate that the debate over this article centered
around the issue of when the air carrier's liability for damage to passengers should begin
and end rather than the scope of compensable injuries." Id. at 854 n.10. Compare the
Rosman court's finding with the Burnett court's willingness to infer an intent by the
Warsaw Convention draftsmen to exclude mental anguish from article 17's purview. See
notes 96-97 supra and accompanying text.
314 N.E.2d at 854.
"" The Rosman case was before the New York Court of Appeals on the defendant's
appeal of summary judgments granted to the plaintiffs by the trial court. Id. at 848.




excludes mental injury with no observable "bodily," as distin-
guished from "behavioural," manifestations." '7
The court cited Husserl P13 and Burnett 9 in support of its
holding. 2
0
C. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.
In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co. (Husserl II),121 Mrs.
Husserl was a passenger on board a Swiss Air flight scheduled
to fly from Zurich, Switzerland, to New York, New York, on
September 6, 1970.122 En route, a group of Arabian terrorists
hijacked the airplane and forced the pilot to fly to the desert
near Amman, Jordan. Mrs. Husserl and the other passengers
were forcibly held on the airplane for "24 hours under circum-
stances less than ideal for physical or mental health.1' 13 The
women and children passengers were thereafter moved to a hotel
in Amman where they stayed until September 11. Mrs. Husserl
finally arrived in New York on September 13.124
As a result of the hijacking, Mrs. Husserl claimed that she
had suffered "bodily injury and severe mental pain and anguish
resulting from her expectations of severe injury and/or death." 
25
She did not claim, however, to have been physically injured. 26
The case first appeared in Husserl 1,127 before a New York
federal district court, on the defendant's motion for summary
judgment or, in the alternative, dismissal of the complaint. 28
The defendant's motion alleged that any claim asserted by the
plaintiff was governed exclusively by the Warsaw Convention;
that the Convention provides liability only for injuries caused
,7 Id. at 855 (footnote omitted).
"' 351 F. Supp. 702.
368 F. Supp. 1152.
See 314 N.E.2d at 857.






'' Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd,
485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
2 351 F. Supp. at 704.
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by an accident; that a hijacking is not an accident; and that,
therefore, no liability attached to it under the factual circum-
stances.' 29 The court rejected the defendant's arguments, and
denied its motion for summary judgment or dismissal.'30 In
dictum, the court opined that mental injuries alone would not
be compensable as a "bodily injury" under article 17 of the
Convention.' 3 '
After an unsuccessful appeal of the Husserl I holding,' 32 the
defendant followed the court's lead and filed a second motion
for summary judgment based on the court's dictum in Husserl
L' 33 The defendant's motion again alleged that any claim asserted
by the plaintiff was governed exclusively by the Warsaw Con-
vention; that the Convention does not provide recovery for
mental anguish alone under article 17; and that the only injuries
alleged by the plaintiff resulted solely from mental anguish.'
34
Resolution of the defendant's allegations produced the Husserl
1]P31 opinion, decided by the same New York federal district
court that had rendered the decision in Husserl I approximately
three years earlier.
In resolving the issue, like the Burnett 36 and Rosman
3 7
courts before it, the Husserl II court undertook to determine for
itself whether mental injuries are compensable under article 17's
provision for "any other bodily injury. '"' 38 The court first opined
that the French legal meaning and interpretation of the treaty
and its terms are not binding. 39 Rather, it found that the Con-
vention has become a part of the federal law of the United
States, and should be interpreted thereunder. The court then
attempted to ascertain the intent of the draftsmen and signatories
concerning inclusion of mental anguish under article 17. The
129 Id.
"3 Id. at 706-07.
'' Id. at 707-08.
" 485 F.2d 1240 (per curiam opinion affirming the district court's decision below).
" 388 F. Supp. at 1242.
" Id.
' Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" See notes 89-97 supra and accompanying text.
"' See notes 107-120 supra and accompanying text.
' The Warsaw Convention, supra note 4, at art. 17.
'3 388 F. Supp. at 1249.
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court reasoned that "the Parties probably had no specific inten-
tion at all about mental and psychosomatic injuries because, if
they had, they would have clearly expressed their intentions."'9
40
The court did find, however, that the draftsmen had the
intent to "effect the purpose" of the treaty and that they "ap-
parently took some pains to make it comprehensive.' ' 4' More-
over, the court found no evidence that the draftsmen "intended
to preclude recovery for any particular type of injury."'' 42 The
court held that the treaty should be construed broadly to cover
many types of injuries, stating:
To regulate in a uniform manner the liability of the carrier,
[the draftsmen] must have intended to be comprehensive. To
effect the treaty's avowed purpose, the types of injuries enum-
erated should be construed expansively to encompass as many
types of injury as are colorably within the ambit of the enum-
erated types. 4
3
The court found mental and psychosomatic injuries to be "col-
orably within that ambit," noting the "vast strides ... taken
relatively recently in ... physiology and psychology," making
it "increasingly evident that the mind is part of the body.' 44
The court held accordingly that mental anguish alone is "com-
prehended by Article 17.V 
45
"- Id.




,, Id. The court also noted that "personal injury" was substituted for "bodily
injury" by article 17 of the Guatemala Protocol, a "treaty drafted to supplant the
Warsaw system," suggesting that the substitution could have been intended to be used
as a "shorthand for the phrase at issue, or as a clarification of it, or as a means of
expanding its comprehension." Id. at 1249-50. The Guatemala Protocol resulted from a
diplomatic conference in Guatemala conducted in 1971 by the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization to amend the Warsaw Convention. Fifty-five countries participated in
producing the Protocol, which calls for absolute liability in article 4, and an increase in
the liability ceiling to 1,500,000 francs, or $100,000.00 per passenger in article 8. Further,
article 10 requires the parties to meet every fifth year to review the liability limit, which
would be increased by $12,500.00 unless otherwise agreed. See Protocol to Amend the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air, March 8, 1971, Guatemala City, Guatemala, ICAO Doc. 8932; Abramovsky, supra
note 1, at 356-59. The United States has never ratified the Protocol, 1 S. SPEISER & C.
KRAusE, AvIATION TORT LAv § 11:20 (1978), which is now known as the Montreal
Protocol because of subsequent conferences in Montreal. Id. (Supp. 1985).
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In reaching its holding, the court recognized that other courts
had reached different conclusions in similar cases decided after
its Husserl I opinion,' 46 and apologized for any reliance placed
by those courts on its dictum in Husserl L 47 Writing for the
majority, Judge Tyler stated:
In reaching this determination, I am not unmindful of
other courts which have reached different conclusions when
deciding similar cases involving mental injuries caused by hi-
jackings. Each court decided its cases after the earlier Husserl
opinion, in which this court raised questions about the meaning
of the phrase at issue and suggested tentative conclusions. To
the extent those courts' citations of that opinion indicated some
small reliance on this court's dictum concerning the phrase at
issue, I proffer my apologies but now conclude that the issue
must be decided as has been indicated. 48
Judge Tyler then briefly discussed the contrary holdings of
Burnett, Rosman and Herman, 49 concluding:
With these scholarly and well-considered opinions, I respect-
fully disagree only to the extent that I believe mental injury
alone should be compensable, if the otherwise applicable sub-
stantive law provides an appropriate cause of action. To hold
otherwise, in my view, would not only create confusing prob-
lems of proof but also limit the effectiveness of the Warsaw
system in achieving its purpose.'5 0
While the court held that mental injuries alone are compre-
hended by article 17, recovery would not be available in every
case. Rather, recovery was limited by the court to cases in which
the "applicable substantive law" provides a cause of action for
mental injuries alone.'15 The court held in dictum that the "ap-
plicable substantive law" should be chosen by conflicts of law
,,6 The court specifically cited Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, and the companion
cases of Herman v. Trans World Airlines and Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, as
having reached opposite conclusions with citations to Husserl I for support. See 388 F.
Supp. at 1251.
,4' See id. at 1250-51.
"4 Id.
,41 See notes 84-120 supra and accompanying text.
110 388 F. Supp. at 1251 (emphasis added).
,", See text accompanying note 150 supra.
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principles. 52 New York's conflicts of law rules were held to
apply,'53 under which New York's substantive law was held to
govern.'5 4 The court noted that the substantive law of New York
provides a cause of action for mental and psychosomatic injuries
alone.
D. Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp.
In Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp.,'56 a federal
district court in California followed Husserl II and held that
mental injuries are compensable under the Warsaw Conven-
tion.5 7 Mr. and Mrs. Krystal were passengers on a British Over-
seas Airways Corporation (BOAC) flight scheduled to fly from
Bombay, India, to London, England. 5 8 The airplane was di-
verted by hijackers to Amsterdam, Holland. 5 9 The Krystals sued
BOAC, claiming damages for mental distress resulting from
fright, anxiety, stress, fear and loss of sleep.'16 BOAC moved
for summary judgment, alleging that such damages are not
compensable under article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.' 6' The
court denied the motion, holding that mental injuries are com-
pensable under article 17 as a matter of law.162
In reaching its decision, the court noted that "[t]his Court
is, of course, aware that other courts have reached contrary
conclusions.' ' 63 The court further opined that "such interpre-
tations of Art. 17 are untenable. It cannot be said, with finality,
that the drafters of the Warsaw Convention intended to preclude
152 388 F. Supp. at 1252. The court admitted that it was "unable to locate any
authority directly on point." Id.
Husserl was a diversity case in a federal court in New York. See id.
I4 ld.
" Id. (citing Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961) (allowing recovery for
mental injuries incurred by negligently induced fright)).
403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
Id. at 1324.
' ' Id. at 1322.
19 Id.
- Id. at 1322-23.
165 Id.
162 Id. at 1324.
161 Id. at 1323.
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recovery for mental distress."' 164 The court cited Husserl H1 as
support. 1
65
E. Are Mental Injuries Compensable Under the
Warsaw Convention?
It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that there is no
uniform answer as to whether damages for mental anguish are
compensable under the Warsaw Convention. A New Mexico
federal district court in Burnett and the highest state court of
New York in Rosman decided that such damages are not com-
pensable under the Warsaw Convention. 66 A New York federal
district court in Husserl IH and a California federal district court
in Krystal held to the contrary.' 67 The Burnett and Rosman
opinions, however, may be challenged to the extent that they
relied upon dictum in Husserl I, which was later overruled in
Husserl 11.163
Compensable injuries under the Warsaw Convention may be
a question for local law. 169 In examining the issue, Professor
Lowenfeld' 70 stated:
The question then comes up, what do you mean by "bodily
injury"? Is a psychic injury a "bodily injury"? The fact is
this was never talked about at Montreal. To the extent that
164 Id.
316 See id. at 1323-24. The Krystal court cited the Montreal Agreement, supra note
55, as additional support for its holding. The court stated:
This Court is of the opinion that the effect of the Montreal Agreement
is to permit recovery for mental distress. Under the Agreement, the sig-
natory airlines agreed, inter alia, that they would print on their tickets a
notification to the passenger of the possible applicability of the Warsaw
Convention.... [T]he actual Notice to which the airlines agreed changed
the relevant wording to . . . "personal injury .... .
It appears that such notice is determinative of the issue. The fact that
"wounding ... or bodily injury" is replaced by "personal injury" . ..
suggests an intention to clarify the type of injury which is compensable.
403 F. Supp. at 1323. Contra Lowenfeld, supra note 75, at 347 n.7.
'1 See notes 84-120 supra and accompanying text.
167 See notes 121-165 supra and accompanying text.
Im See notes 146-150 supra and accompanying text.
,69 See Lowenfeld, supra note 67a, at 349-50.
110 Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Professor Lowenfeld
represented the United States Department of State at the negotiations in Montreal that
resulted in the Montreal Agreement. See notes 51-65 supra and accompanying text.
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there was any thought about it, the assumption was that the
meaning goes back to what was intended in the Warsaw Con-
vention itself. I have looked back at the words of the Warsaw
Convention, and there isn't anything there either. No one,
either in the Warsaw meetings in 1929 or in the preparatory
meetings in the period 1925-29, made any effort to distinguish





Unable to obtain any guidance from the history of the Con-
vention or the intent of its draftsmen, Professor Lowenfeld
rejected any contention that French law be consulted, and found
the New York court's suggestion to that effect "misguided.' ' 172
He concluded that "this is one of those subjects that the Warsaw
Convention, including now the Montreal Agreement, leaves to
local decision.'1 7  Professor Lowenfeld supported his theory by
citing provisions of the Convention that leave other questions to
local law.
74
Professor Lowenfeld further suggested that state law is the
applicable law in a diversity case in federal district court. '7 His sug-
gestions and opinions were expressly rejected by the Rosman court
76
and accepted and applied by the Husserl II court.
77
", Lowenfeld, supra note 74, at 347.
In d. at 348. Professor Lowenfeld was referring specifically to the Kings County
Supreme Court's construction of the language of article 17 according to the French legal
meaning of its terms. See Herman v. Trans World Airlines, 330 N.Y.S.2d 829, 832
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972). The appellate division apparently agreed with the lower court's
approach to the convention, though it reversed the supreme court decision on the grounds
that the French legal meaning of the words translated as "personal injuries" was a
triable issue of fact. See Herman v. Trans World Airlines, 337 N.Y.S. 827, 828 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1972).
Although Professor Lowenfeld's article was written and published prior to the New
York Court of Appeals' review of the Herman case, his comments concerning the lower
courts' adoption of the French legal meaning of the terms in article 17 apply with equal
force to the higher court's decision, which adopted the lower courts' method of con-
struction. See Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 314 N.E.2d at 851-54. See note 109
supra and accompanying text.
" Lowenfeld, supra note 74, at 349.
174 See id. Specifically, questions of contributory negligence (article 21), procedure
(article 28(2)), and the method for calculating the two-year statute of limitations (article
29(2)) are left to the law of the forum.
"I Id. at 350. Professor Lowenfeld rejected the idea that courts should apply federal
law simply because the issue is a matter of treaty interpretation. See id.
176 See 314 N.E.2d at 856. The court stated, "The application of local law would
impress an artificial sense upon the terms which finds no warrant in the treaty and such
a course would surely be a deviation from the principles of treaty construction." Id.
I" See 388 F. Supp. at 1252.
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
CONCLUSION
The Warsaw Convention was created to eliminate legal un-
certainty in an emerging international airline industry by pro-
mulgating uniform rules of law for carrier liability.' 78 Even under
the Convention, however, carrier liability for mental injuries
resulting from hijackings is anything but certain or uniform.
Some courts 179 have held that mental anguish is comprehended
by article 17's provision for "death or wounding ... or any
other bodily injury;"' 80 other courts' 8' have reached the opposite
conclusion. What does seem certain is that the Convention's
draftsmen probably never considered the issue.'82
The majority of airline hijacking victims are not physically
injured;' 83 rather, their only injuries consist of mental distress
resulting from fear and anxiety.184 For victims and their attor-
neys, the lesson to be learned from the foregoing discussion is
clear-choose your forum carefully. The only certainty at the
moment is that the federal district courts in New York and
California have entertained causes of action for mental injuries
under the Warsaw Convention. In other jurisdictions, your only
solace may be that you were lucky enough to escape with your
physical health and your life.
Karen M. Campbell
,7 See notes 21-36 supra and accompanying text.
,, See notes 121-65 supra and accompanying text.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 4, at art. 17.
,81 See notes 84-120 supra and accompanying text.
'8 See note 171 supra and accompanying text.
,8 See Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 348.
,8 Id.
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